
v.

After a court trial, I entered judgment on behalf of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. C07-3540 BZ

ATTORNEY'S FEES

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

HAAS INDUSTRIES, INC,

Plaintiff(s),

ONEBEACON INSURANCE COMPANY,)

Defendant(s).

)

OneBeacon Insurance Company ("OneBeacon") sued Haas
Industries, Inc. ("Haas") as the subrogee of Professional
Products, Inc. ("PPI") under the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, to recover the
cost of PPI's lost electronic equipment. Omneon Video
Networks ("Omneon") had sold the equipment to PPI, and
arranged for Haas to ship the equipment. Some of the
equipment was lost in transit. OneBeacon claimed that under
section 14706, Haas was liable for the actual value of the
equipment because Haas' bill of lading failed to adequately
limit its liability.

Haas. I found that OneBeacon did not have standing to sue under the relevant portion of the Carmack Amendment¹ and that, regardless of the standing issue, OneBeacon had successfully limited its liability under the Carmack Amendment. Haas has now moved to recover its attorney's fees under the fee provision in the bill of lading. It provides that: "[s]hould Haas Industries successfully defend itself of any legal actions brought by any party with an interest in this shipment, Haas Industries shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs."

OneBeacon opposes the motion on two grounds. OneBeacon contends that attorney's fees are not recoverable in Carmack Amendment cases and that Haas is not entitled to attorney's fees because it did not request them in its answer.²

OneBeacon is correct that the relevant section of the Carmack Amendment does not provide for attorney's fees. Mosso v. Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc., No. 1:07-00005, 2007 WL 2746723, at *5 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 19,2007). However, this does not prevent the parties from agreeing to a provision awarding attorney's fees in the bill of lading. Id. at *6; see also Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Amer. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 127 S.Ct. 1199, 1203 (2007) (The American rule that the

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ 49 U.S.C. section 14706(a)(I) provides that a carrier is "liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading."

At the hearing, OneBeacon raised several additional arguments that it did not raise in its opposition. I decline to consider these arguments for the purpose of deciding this motion. Palacios v. City of Oakland, 970 F.Supp. 732, 744 (N.D. Cal. 1997). There will be no further briefing on these arguments.

2.0

prevailing party is not entitled to attorney's fees can be overcome by an enforceable contract providing for them.) As Mosso noted, neither Accura Sys., Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 1996) nor PolyGram Group Distribution, Inc. v. Transus, Inc., 990 F.Supp. 1454 (N.D. Ga. 1997), the same cases on which OneBeacon relies, "nor any other case interpreting § 14706 addresses the validity of attorney's fees provisions included within a bill of lading." Id. at *5.

Nor am I persuaded by OneBeacon's second ground for opposing the motion, that Haas is precluded from requesting attorney's fees because they were not requested in its answer.³ OneBeacon cites no authority, and I am not aware of any, that would deny a defendant fees if not prayed for in its answer. The cases OneBeacon cites involve plaintiffs who failed to demand attorney's fees in their complaints, often where the fees were deemed to be special damages which must be sought in the prayer. None of OneBeacon's cases require a defendant to pray for attorney's fees on the answer.⁴ More persuasive is the Fifth Circuit's holding in Engel v.

Teleprompter Corp., that a prevailing defendant in a breach of contract case could collect attorney's fees even if it failed

³ Haas did pray for its costs of suit.

Plaintiff does cite to Judge Schwarzer's treatise which states that a defendant "should" set forth a request for attorney's fees in the answer. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 8:249 (2008). However, the treatise cites no authority for that proposition, instead relying on cases involving a plaintiff's duty to pray for attorney's fees in the complaint. Id. at 8:154.

to seek fees in its answer. 732 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Where a statute or contractual provision authorizes a fee award, such an award becomes the rule rather than the exception, and should be awarded routinely as are costs of suit. We stress that no one disputes that the present contract authorizes a fee award under these circumstances." Id. at 1241) see also James WM. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.72[1][d] (2008) ("court should award attorney's fees under Rule 54(c)⁵ whenever that relief is appropriate under the law and the facts proven, and timely and properly documented motion for fees is filed under Rule 54(d)(2)").⁶

Haas' request for attorney's fees is timely under Local Rule 54-6(a). Other than the two arguments addressed above, OneBeacon makes no claim that the fee provision is not enforceable. Nor does it challenge the hours claimed or the rate requested. I find that Haas' request for \$46,200 in fees (220 hours at \$210.00 per hour) is reasonable in light of the significant time required to defend this action, including OneBeacon's motion for summary judgment and its claims at trial. As such, Haas' motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED

///

2.0

Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted. . . . Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

OneBeacon does not claim it has been prejudiced by Haas' failure to request fees, which is not surprising since OneBeacon pled the existence of bill of lading that contained the fee provision.

and it is awarded \$46,200 in fees. Dated: September 18, 2008 **Z**immerman United States Magistrate Judge G:\BZALL\-BZCASES\ONE BEACON\ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.BZ VERSION.wpd